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Abstract
Recent empirical evidence has suggested a positive association between various
measures of investor protection and financial markets’ development, and between
financial markets’ development and economic growth. We introduce investor pro-
tection in a simple extension of the two-period overlapping generations model of
capital accumulation and study how it affects economic growth. Investor protec-
tion is positively related to risk-sharing. As is standard in models of investment
with risk-averse agents, better protection (better risk sharing) results in a larger
demand for capital. This is the demand effect. A second effect, which we call the
supply effect, follows from general equilibrium restrictions. For a given aggregate
capital stock, better protection (i.e. a higher demand schedule) implies a higher
interest rate. The aggregate resource constraint then implies lower income for the
entrepreneurs (the younger cohort). As a result, current savings and the supply
of capital in the following period decrease. It turns out that the strength of the
supply effect is greater, the tighter the restrictions on capital flows. Therefore
our model predicts that the positive effect of investor protection on growth is
stronger for countries with lower restrictions. We find that the data provides
some support for this prediction.
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1 Introduction
Recent work beginning with La Porta et al. (1998) has documented considerable
cross-country differences in many indicators of investor protection. These indicators
measure the extent to which commercial law and its enforcement protect investors
from expropriation by company insiders. Importantly, La Porta et al. (1997) found
that countries with poorer investor protection have smaller and narrower financial
markets: relative to the size of the economy, individuals in these countries trade
less often in financial markets; the value of publicly traded securities is lower; and
the overall number of market participants is also lower. Work by King and Levine
(1993a,b) and Levine and Zervos (1998) has found that well-functioning financial
markets are positively associated with economic growth. Using micro data, Rajan
and Zingales (1998) and Demirgu¨c¸ and Maksimovic (1998) documented the same
type of association. Together, these results suggest a link between investor protection
and growth.
In this paper we investigate the effects of investor protection on growth in a simple
extension of the overlapping generations model of capital accumulation due to Dia-
mond (1965). In our setup, each young individual has access to a decreasing returns to
scale production technology. In contrast to Diamond, the outcome of the production
process is stochastic, i.i.d. across technologies, and known only to the technology’s
owner. Lacking an initial endowment, and needing resources to use their technol-
ogy, young individuals, who we refer to as entrepreneurs, borrow capital from the old
through financial intermediaries. These intermediaries transfer resources from the old
to the young by borrowing from the old at the equilibrium rental rate and lending
to the young using optimal lending contracts with terms contingent on all public in-
formation. In common with much of the literature on optimal contracts with hidden
information, we model the interaction between intermediaries and entrepreneurs as a
message game.
We assume that entrepreneurs who misreport their outcomes and hide resources
face a deadweight loss. A fraction of the resources hidden from investors gets wasted.
If hiding is costless, we say that there is no investor protection. If hiding is so
difficult that all hidden resources are lost, investor protection is perfect. Our hiding
cost resembles the falsification cost considered by Lacker and Weinberg (1989) and
is intended to capture all institutional features that limit the ability of insiders to
expropriate outside investors.
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We first show that the degree of risk sharing implied by the optimal contract
is monotone in the level of investor protection. The better the protection, i.e. the
larger the cost of hiding resources, the lower the risk borne by borrowers. Therefore,
better investor protection leads to better risk sharing. Our main result is that the
relation between investor protection and growth depends on two opposing effects.
The first effect, which we call the demand effect, supports a positive association
between investor protection and growth. An improvement in investor protection leads
to better risk sharing. As in any partial equilibrium model of investment with risk-
averse entrepreneurs, better risk sharing implies a larger demand for capital at any
given interest rate. The second effect, which we call the supply effect, is a general
equilibrium effect that always works in the direction of a negative association between
investor protection and growth. For a given aggregate capital stock, better investor
protection (i.e. a higher demand schedule) implies a higher interest rate, which,
given the total resources available, translates into lower income for entrepreneurs. In
other words, an improvement in investor protection prompts a redistribution away
from entrepreneurs (the young generation) towards lenders (the old generation). As
a result, current savings and the supply of capital in the following period decrease.
We find that the strength of the supply effect, and therefore the sign of the net
effect, depends on international capital mobility. In an economy with no cross-border
capital flows, the impact of the supply effect is greatest. As a result, better investor
protection can lead to lower growth rates and lower steady state values for both
capital and output. At the other extreme, in a small economy without restrictions on
capital flows, the interest rate is fixed by world capital markets, so that the supply
effect disappears, and more investor protection implies higher growth rates and higher
steady state values for both capital and output. Presumably the extent of capital
mobility for most national economies is somewhere between these two extreme cases.
Thus, both the demand and the supply effects will typically be at work, with the
strength of the supply effect increasing with the extent to which the government
hinders capital flows. It follows that the positive effect of investor protection on
growth should be larger for countries that impose lower restrictions on capital flows.
Do cross-country data provide any support for our predictions? We answer this
question by applying a variety of methodologies. First, we document the positive
association between the indicators of investor protection introduced by La Porta et al.
(1998), and two indirect measures of risk sharing. Then, we investigate whether the
relationship between investor protection and growth depends on the extent to which
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capital flows are restricted. Using standard techniques from the empirical growth
literature, we show that the (positive) impact of investor protection on growth is
much larger for open economies than for closed ones. Finally, we consider in detail
the development experience of a particular country pair: South Korea and India. We
ask why, in the post-WWII period, what looked like similar growth-promoting policies
resulted in a much higher saving rate and growth rate in Korea than in India. We
argue that differences in institutions might have mattered. According to La Porta
et al. (1998), India has better investor protection than Korea. Since both countries
have severely restricted capital flows, the outcome just described is what our model
suggests would be observed.
The theoretical literature on the effects of investor protection is small but growing
rapidly. In particular, our work is related to recent contributions by Himmelberg et al.
(2002), Shleifer and Wolfenzon (2002), Almeida and Wolfenzon (2002), and Himmel-
berg and Quadrini (2002). Himmelberg et. al. consider the investment decision of a
risk-averse entrepreneur who raises funds from outside investors. Investor protection
is modelled as the cost the insider incurs when diverting resources from his financiers.
Their model predicts that poorer investor protection is associated with larger own-
ership concentration and less risk sharing, and therefore smaller firm size.1 Shleifer
and Wolfenzon embed Himmelberg et. al.’s agency model in a static equilibrium
setup. They show how investor protection affects the size of the equity market and
the number of public firms. Almeida and Wolfenzon study the allocation of capital
in a 2-period equilibrium model, under the assumption that imperfect enforcement
of contracts limits the ability of entrepreneurs to commit to repay their financiers.
Finally, Himmelberg and Quadrini study the optimal dynamic financing contract be-
tween a risk-averse entrepreneur and a risk-neutral investor under the assumption
that the latter might not observe the entrepreneur’s revenues. They show that own-
ership concentration is lower when investors are more likely to observe the revenues
(i.e. when investor protection is better).
Our paper can also be seen as part of a large theoretical literature analyzing the
relation between capital accumulation and imperfections in financial markets. Papers
that investigate the effects of imperfect risk sharing on savings in general equilibrium
are particularly related to ours, e.g., Aiyagari (1994) and Devereux and Smith (1994).
1Himmelberg et al. (2002) estimate the size of the risk-premium dictated by ownership concentra-
tion and use their model along with data on inside ownership to determine a measure of its effect on
firm size.
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Aiyagari studies the effects of market incompleteness on the steady state capital stock
in a version of the standard growth model. In his model, precautionary savings are
responsible for the positive effect of imperfect risk sharing on capital accumulation.
Devereux and Smith study a multi-country model in which each country faces income
risk, but there is no uncertainty at the worldwide level. Growth rates in all countries
turn out to be lower when financial markets are integrated. Again, this happens
because the ability to trade lowers the importance of the precautionary motive. Our
framework differs from Aiyagari’s and Devereux and Smith’s along several dimensions.
First, in their models individuals borrow for the purpose of consumption smoothing,
while in ours they raise funds in order to finance investment. Second, in our scenario
there is no precautionary motive, since second-period income is known to the agents
when they make their saving decision. Finally, in our model the degree of market
incompleteness is endogenous.
As it is the case here, in Marcet and Marimon (1992) and Khan and Raviku-
mar (2001) the assumption of asymmetric information is responsible for suboptimal
risk sharing. However, their implications for growth are different. In Marcet and
Marimon (1992) imperfect risk sharing has no effect on capital accumulation. Khan
and Ravikumar (2001) find that the economy with private information (and partial
insurance) displays lower growth rates of capital and output than the economy with
symmetric information (and full insurance). In Section 3.2 we discuss at length the
fundamental differences between our framework and theirs.
Finally, our work is also related to the seminal theoretical studies of the rela-
tionship between financial market development and growth, such as Greenwood and
Jovanovic (1990) and Bencivenga and Smith (1991).
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The model is introduced in
Section 2. Section 3 characterizes the competitive equilibrium allocation in a closed
economy, and identifies the demand and supply effects. In Section 4 we explore the
small open economy case. In Section 5 we derive the empirical implication for the
relation between investor protection, capital mobility, and growth and we conduct the
data analysis. Section 6 concludes.
4
2 Model
We consider a simple extension of the standard two-period Overlapping Generations
Model.2 The population is constant and the measure of each cohort is normalized
to one. Individuals are risk-averse. Preferences are time-separable and the period
utility, denoted by u(ct), displays constant relative risk aversion.
3 Let σ denote the
coefficient of relative risk aversion. Agents discount second-period utility at the rate
β; β ∈ (0, 1).
Young individuals, the entrepreneurs, are endowed with investment opportunities
described by the technology F (zt, kt) = ztf(kt), where k denotes physical capital. We
assume that f is C2 and satisfies f(0) = 0, f ′ > 0, f ′′ < 0, limk→0 f
′(k) = ∞, and
limk→∞ f
′(k) = 0. Capital depreciates at the constant rate δ ∈ (0, 1). The random
variable zt determines the quality of the investment project. We assume that for every
t, zt ∈ {zl, zh}, where zh > zl and pr{zt = zh} = ρ; ρ ∈ (0, 1).
4 Old individuals do
not work, and consume from assets accumulated when young.
Since entrepreneurs have no endowment, they can undertake their projects only
if the old generation finances them. We assume financial intermediaries that borrow
capital from the old cohort at the equilibrium rental rate, and lend to entrepreneurs
via Constrained-Pareto optimal one-period contracts.5 The intermediation sector is
perfectly competitive and has free-entry.
The realization of the random variable zt is private information for the entrepreneurs,
who have the option of hiding some of their cash-flows from their financiers. Hiding,
however, is costly. For every unit of cash-flow hidden, an entrepreneur ends up with
only the fraction ξ ∈ [0, 1]. The balance is lost in the hiding process.6 The parameter
ξ is our measure of investor protection – the larger is ξ, the lower the protection. The
two extreme values identify the cases of complete absence of protection (ξ = 1) and
perfect protection (ξ = 0).
2Our setup is similar to the one used by Lacker et al. (1990) to study the asset pricing implications
of asymmetric information. As it will become clear, none of our results hinges upon the assumption
of two-period lives.
3We restrict our attention to the CRRA family, because utility functions in this class display
non-increasing absolute risk-aversion and imply indirect utility functions that are log-separable in
the interest rate. Both features are needed to establish our main results.
4It is straightforward to modify our setup to allow for balanced growth, provided that the tech-
nology is consistent with it (e.g. with Cobb-Douglas). It suffices to assume that zi,t+1/zi,t = γ > 1
for i = h, l. All of our results would hold for the modified model, once variables are detrended.
5In Appendix A we discuss why do we focus on one-period contracts.
6All of our results follow even when a portion, or the totality of this balance accrues to the
intermediaries. The only caveat is that in such case it is necessary to work with a continuum of
outcomes. Otherwise, any hiding would be detected by the lender. See Appendix B for details.
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Figure 1: Timing.
Figure 1 displays the timing assumed in the model. At the outset, an entrepreneur
borrows capital, kt, from an intermediary, then invests and produces output equal to
ztf(kt). Next, he makes a claim about the quality of his project zˆt ∈ {zh, zl}, gives the
intermediary output consistent with this claim, i.e. zˆtf(kt), and receives a contingent
transfer τt(zˆt).
7 Therefore a financing contract consists of a capital advance, kt, and
contingent transfers τht and τlt.
At the end of the first period, entrepreneurs end up with income we denote by mt.
If the project is of low quality, necessarily mt = τlt. Having no endowment, an agent
is unable to misreport in the low state, since that would entail surrendering a level of
output zhf(kt). If the project is of high quality, truthful reporting yields mt = τht,
and concealing yields mt = τlt + ξ∆f(kt), where ∆ ≡ zh − zl. By misreporting,
the entrepreneur receives the transfer intended for low quality projects, τlt, plus the
fraction ξ of the hidden output ∆f(kt). At the end of the first stage of their lives,
agents consume part of their income and save the rest. At the beginning of the second
stage, they lend their savings to intermediaries at the market rate. Intermediaries
channel those funds to the new cohort of young people. At the end of their lives,
agents receive and consume principal and interest.
7In Appendix B we show that under our assumptions the Constrained-Pareto optimal contract
always requires the output surrendered to be consistent with the report. In turn, this implies no
hiding along the equilibrium path.
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3 Competitive equilibrium
We start by considering an entrepreneur’s consumption-saving decision. Let v(mt, rt+1)
denote the indirect utility of an agent born at time t, conditional on having received
an income mt and on facing an interest rate rt+1. Then,
v(mt, rt+1) ≡ u [mt − s(mt, rt+1)] + βu [(1 + rt+1)s(mt, rt+1)] , (P1)
where the optimal saving function s(mt, rt+1) is
s (mt, rt+1) ≡ argmax
s
{u (mt − s) + βu [(1 + rt+1) s]} . (1)
An optimal contract is a triple (kt, τht, τlt) that solves the optimization problem:
max
kt,τht,τlt
ρv (τht, rt+1) + (1− ρ) v (τlt, rt+1) , (P2)
subject to incentive compatibility for entrepreneurs whose projects are high quality,
i.e.,
v (τht, rt+1) ≥ v [τlt + ξ∆f(kt), rt+1] , (2)
and the zero-profit condition for intermediaries:
τ¯t ≡ ρτht + (1− ρ) τlt = z¯f (kt)− (rt + δ) kt, (3)
where z¯ ≡ ρzh + (1− ρ)zl. We now define a competitive equilibrium.
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Definition 1 Given an initial capital stock k0 > 0, a competitive equilibrium is a con-
sumption level of the initial old co0, contingent consumption allocations for young and
old individuals, {cyht, c
y
lt}
∞
t=0 and {c
o
ht, c
o
lt}
∞
t=1, and sequences of contracts, {kt, τht, τlt}
∞
t=0 ,
and interest rates, {rt}
∞
t=0, such that
1. consumers optimize, i.e. co0 = k0(1 + r0), and for i = h, l and t ≥ 0, c
y
it =
τit − s(τit, rt+1) and c
o
it+1 = s(τit, rt+1)(1 + rt+1);
2. contracts are optimal, i.e. for all t ≥ 0, they solve problem (P1); and
3. the goods market clears at all t ≥ 0:
kt+1 = ρs (τht; rt+1) + (1− ρ) s (τlt; rt+1) . (4)
8Since every generation consists of a measure one of ex-ante identical individuals, the capital
assigned to every entrepreneur must equal aggregate capital. For this reason, we use the same
notation for the two variables.
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In the remainder of this section we characterize the evolution of this economy,
and then explore how the nature of financial claims and the paths of variables such
as capital and output change in response to variations in the investor protection
parameter ξ.
3.1 Benchmark: Perfect investor protection (ξ = 0)
For ξ = 0, our model is isomorphic to Diamond (1965)’s. Thus, for every t, given an
interest rate rt, the demand for capital satisfies the optimality condition
z¯f ′ (kt)− δ = rt. (5)
Also, strict concavity of the utility function implies τht = τlt. Since intermediaries are
risk neutral, an optimal contract insures entrepreneurs fully, making intermediaries
residual claimants on the projects’ cash-flows. From the zero-profit condition, together
with (5), transfers are functions of capital only, and are given by
τt = τ(kt) = z¯
[
f (kt)− f
′ (kt) kt
]
.
The gross return on investment for the intermediaries Rit is given by
Rit =
zif (kt)− τt
kt
for i = h, l, (6)
and it follows that
Rht −Rlt =
∆f (kt)
kt
.
The financial claims held by the intermediaries resemble equity claims. Finally, given
k0 > 0, the behavior of the economy is completely described by (5), along with the
difference equation
kt+1 = s [τ(kt); rt+1] .
For ξ = 0, our economy evolves exactly as a standard OLG model with constant
productivity z¯, competitive capital and labor markets, and inelastic labor supply; the
wage is equal to τt.
3.2 Imperfect investor protection (ξ ∈ (0, 1])
In this subsection we show that when ξ > 0, the effect of investor protection on capital
accumulation can be decomposed into a (positive) demand effect and a (negative)
general equilibrium effect on supply. While the net effect ultimately depends on the
utility specification, it turns out that for a large subset of the parameter space better
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investor protection leads to less investment and less accumulation. The intuition is as
follows. Lower ξ (better investor protection) implies better risk sharing. This implies
that entrepreneurs will demand more capital for a given interest rate. This is the
demand effect. For given capital, however, lower risk will demand a lower expected
return. That is, the average level of transfers from intermediaries to entrepreneurs
will be lower. This implies that in average entrepreneurs will earn less and save less,
so that the capital supply curve will also be lower. This is the supply effect. In the
remainder of this section, we characterize the demand effect and then we show how
it interacts with the supply effect.
First, observe that for any rt+1, v(τt, rt+1) is strictly increasing and strictly concave
in τt. By strict concavity, (2) must bind in the solution. Then, by strict monotonicity,
it follows that τht = τlt+ξ∆f (kt) for any t. By the zero-profit condition (3), transfers
are given by
τlt = τl(kt, rt) = (z¯ − ρξ∆) f (kt)− (rt + δ) kt (7)
and
τht = τh(kt, rt) = (z¯ + (1− ρ) ξ∆) f (kt)− (rt + δ) kt. (8)
Substituting for τlt and τht in (6) yields
Rht −Rlt =
(1− ξ)∆f (kt)
kt
.
Risk-sharing is imperfect. Since (Rht − Rlt)kt < ∆f (kt), entrepreneurs bear part of
the risk. Also, this part is increasing in ξ. In the extreme, when ξ = 1, the contract
provides no risk sharing at all, and the claim held by the intermediary amounts
to a standard debt contract. There is some empirical evidence that countries with
better investor protection also provide entrepreneurs with better opportunities for
risk sharing. We discuss this evidence in Section 5.1.
We now show that the aggregate demand for capital is decreasing in both rt and
ξ. Using the incentive compatibility condition, and letting yt ≡ f(kt), problem (P1)
can be restated as
max
τ¯t,yt
V (τ¯t, yt) ≡ ρv [τ¯t + (1− ρ)∆ξyt, rt+1] + (1− ρ) v [τ¯t − ρ∆ξyt, rt+1] ,
subject to
τ¯t = z¯yt − (rt + δ) f
−1 (yt) . (BC)
V (τ¯t, yt) implies a collection of level sets. The necessary conditions associated with
problem (P1) can be expressed in terms of tangency between these level sets and (BC).
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For given rt and rt+1, the optimal pair (τ¯t, yt) must solve the system of equations given
by the budget constraint (BC) and the condition
∂τ¯t
∂yt
∣∣∣∣
BC
=
∂τ¯t
∂yt
∣∣∣∣
V
. (9)
Using the envelope theorem:
∂τ¯t
∂yt
∣∣∣∣
BC
= z¯ − (rt + δ)
df−1 (yt)
dyt
,
∂τ¯t
∂yt
∣∣∣∣
V
= −ρ (1− ρ) ξ∆
u′ (cht)− u
′ (clt)
ρu′ (cht) + (1− ρ)u′ (clt)
> 0.
Since f and u are strictly concave functions, the level sets for V (τ¯t, yt) are strictly
convex and the budget constraint is strictly concave. It follows that the optimal
pair (τ¯t, yt) is unique. Furthermore, since the budget constraint is steeper at yt = 0,
τ¯t, yt > 0. Since f is strictly increasing, the optimal yt uniquely determines an optimal
kt = f
−1 (yt). The consumption allocations are then given by
cit = τi (kt)− s (τi (kt) ; rt+1) for i = h, l.
Under our assumptions on preferences, it follows that
cit = [1− κ (rt+1)] τit for i = h, l,
where
κ (rt+1) =
1
1 + β−
1
σ (1 + rt+1)
σ−1
σ
.
Finally, since the indirect utility function is log-separable in rt+1, we can rewrite the
slope of the indifference curves as
∂τ¯t
∂yt
∣∣∣∣
V
= −ρ (1− ρ) ξ∆
u′ (τht)− u
′ (τlt)
ρu′ (τht) + (1− ρ)u′ (τlt)
> 0.
In turn, this implies that the optimal pair (kt, τ¯t) (and the aggregate demand for
capital) does not depend on rt+1.
For given k0 > 0, the economy’s evolution is completely characterized by condi-
tions (9) and (BC), which define the demand for capital kt = D(rt; ξ), together with
(4), which defines the supply of capital kt+1 = S(kt, rt, rt+1).
Proposition 1 The function D(rt, ξ) is strictly decreasing in both rt and ξ.
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Figure 2: Effect of an increase in rt.
Proof. 1. D(rt; ξ) is decreasing in rt. Refer to Figure 2. Start with an optimal k
0
t .
This implies y0t = f
(
k0t
)
and a level of the interest rate r0t = D
−1(k0t , ξ). Now consider
any r1t > r
0
t . Since
∂τ¯t
∂rt
∣∣∣
BC
= −kt < 0, the budget constraint shifts from BC0 to BC1.
To show that the optimal capital advance associated with the higher interest rate is
k1t < k
0
t , it is enough to show that
∂
∂τ¯t
(
∂τ¯t
∂yt
∣∣∣
V
)
≤ 0. Simple calculations reveal that
∂
∂τ¯t
(
∂τ¯t
∂yt
∣∣∣
V
)
= − ρ(1−ρ)ξ∆u
′(τht)u
′(τlt)
[ρu′(τht)+(1−ρ)u′(τlt)]
2 [RA (τlt)−RA (τht)], where RA (τit) ≡ −
u′′(τit)
u′(τit)
denotes the coefficient of absolute risk-aversion. Therefore, a sufficient condition for
∂
∂τ¯t
(
∂τ¯t
∂yt
∣∣∣
V
)
≤ 0 is that the utility function displays non-increasing absolute risk-
aversion. This condition is satisfied by CRRA preferences.
2. D(rt; ξ) is strictly decreasing in ξ. Refer to Figure 3. Consider any ξ = ξ0 ∈
(0, 1). Let k0t denote the corresponding optimal capital advance, and let y
0
t = f
(
k0t
)
.
Now consider any ξ1 > ξ0. The budget constraint BC is invariant to such modification.
On the other hand, some algebra shows that risk aversion implies ∂∂ξ
(
∂τ¯t
∂yt
∣∣∣
V
)
> 0.
For given rt, the new optimal capital advance k
1
t must be strictly lower than k
0
t .
We now turn to comparing the dynamics of two economies differing only in terms
of ξ. Let ξ and ξˆ be the degrees of investor protection in the two economies, and
suppose ξˆ > ξ. Start with date t = 0. Since the capital stock is given, the supply of
capital by the old generation is completely inelastic at k0. The difference in investor
protection is reflected in different demand schedules. The result, illustrated in Figure
4, is that the interest rate r0 is lower in the economy with poorer investor protec-
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Figure 3: Effect of an increase in ξ.
tion, and the expected income of entrepreneurs τ¯0 is higher. The economic intuition
is straightforward. Since the number of entrepreneurs is constant, the capital per
entrepreneur must be k0 in both economies. In the economy with poorer investor
protection, the optimal contract allows for less risk sharing. For the young to accept
the greater risk, their expected return, τ¯0, must be larger. Finally, the aggregate
resource constraint dictates that this can happen only if r0 is lower.
From Proposition 1, at any t the demand schedule will be lower the higher the
parameter ξ. A larger value of τ¯0 implies an outward shift of the supply curve at
t = 1. This results in a higher or lower value of k1 depending on the relative slopes
of demand and supply, as well as on the magnitudes of their shifts.
If the income effect deriving from an interest rate change dominates the substitu-
tion effect in a way that causes the slope of the supply curve to be greater than the
slope of the demand curve (in absolute value), then, for all t ≥ 1, kt (ξ) < kt(ξˆ). This
occurs, for example, if the utility function is logarithmic. In such cases, the income
and substitution effects exactly offset each other. As a result, savings are a constant
proportion of transfers. This implies that at all t the supply of capital is inelastic and
given by
kt+1 =
β
1 + β
τ¯t.
Finally, this means that for any pair (ξ, ξˆ) with ξˆ > ξ, τ¯0(ξˆ) > τ¯0(ξ). It will also
be the case that k1(ξˆ) > k1(ξ) and r1(ξˆ) < r1(ξ), and thus τ¯1(ξˆ) > τ¯1(ξ); refer to
12
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Figure 4: Date t = 0.
Figure 5. By repeating the same argument at any time t, we conclude that capital
accumulation is always higher in the economy with poorer investor protection.9
3.3 The Cobb-Douglas production function
Proposition 2 shows that when the technology is described by a Cobb-Douglas pro-
duction function, entrepreneurs’ income can be expressed in a very convenient form.
Proposition 2 If f(kt) = k
α
t with α ∈ (0, 1), then τit = gif(kt) for some constants
gi, i = h, l.
Proof. Since the optimal contract (τ¯t, kt) is unique for given rt, it suffices to
check that τit = gif(kt) satisfies the necessary conditions (7), (8) and (9). Therefore,
assume that τit = gif(kt). Then, (9) implies that
(rt + δ)kt = α
[
z¯ + ρ(1− ρ)ξ∆
u′ (gh)− u
′ (gl)
ρu′ (gh) + (1− ρ)u′ (gl)
]
kαt . (10)
Substituting this expression in (7) and (8) verifies our conjecture.
The paths for capital stock and interest rate are jointly determined by the con-
temporaneous equation (10), which determines the demand for capital as a function
9Notice that, there being no uncertainty in the second stage of people’s lives, the precautionary
motive for saving is absent in our model. Introducing such motive would only reinforce the supply
effect described above, without producing any further insight.
13
-6
k1
r1
D1(ξ)
D1(ξˆ)
S1(ξ) S1(ξˆ)
k1(ξ) k1(ξˆ)
r1(ξ)
r1(ξˆ)
Figure 5: Date t = 1.
of the interest rate, and by the first-order difference equation
kt+1 = κ(rt+1) [ρgh + (1− ρ)gl] k
α
t , (11)
which defines the supply of capital.
Assessing the effect of investor protection on capital accumulation with generality
is nontrivial. As argued above, the net effect deriving from a change in investor
protection depends on the relative slopes of demand and supply. Equations (10)
and (11) reveal that both slopes are nonlinear in the same set of parameters. The
coefficient of relative risk aversion σ plays a particularly important role. Clearly, it
affects the magnitude of the demand shift induced by a higher ξ. Since σ is just the
inverse of the intertemporal elasticity of substitution, it also affects the shift of the
supply schedule, as well as its elasticity with respect to the interest rate.
As it may be expected, assuming logarithmic utility removes any ambiguity. In
this case, κ(rt+1) = β/ (1 + β), so the path of capital is uniquely determined by (11).
Condition (10) only determines the level of the equilibrium interest rate. Since the
term in square brackets in (11) is strictly increasing in ξ, we can show that poorer
investor protection always implies higher capital accumulation.10
It turns out that, even when the coefficient of relative risk aversion is different
from 1, our result still holds in most cases. That is, for most parameterizations, a
10With log preferences the model admits a solution in closed form, i.e., it is possible to express gl
and gh as explicit functions of the model’s parameters.
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Figure 6: Comparative Dynamics (Dotted line = higher ξ).
higher value for ξ (poorer investor protection) implies higher levels of capital at all
dates. In all such cases, poorer investor protection also implies higher paths for the
growth rate of output and the saving rate, and a lower path for the interest rate.
Figure 6 shows the typical dynamics of capital, output growth rate, interest rate,
entrepreneurial income, saving rate, and welfare, in a scenario with σ 6= 1.11
11In the panel dedicated to the transfers, the top two paths depict the evolution of τht for two dif-
ferent levels of ξ, the middle two paths depict the evolution of τ¯t, and the bottom two the evolution
of τlt. The levels of ξ used to produce the figure are 0.2 and 0.8, respectively. The other parameter
values are α = 1/3, δ = 0.15, zh = 2, z¯ = 1, ρ = 0.4, β = 0.99, σ = 0.6. There are parameteriza-
tions for which a higher ξ leads to lower accumulation. The demand effect tends to dominate when
the discount rate β is low, so that the propensity to save is also low. For instance, this is the case
when β = 0.2, with all remaining parameter values as before.
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Notice that the transition paths for capital depicted in Figure 6 could have been
generated by economies having the same level of investor protection but different
levels of total factor productivity z¯. However, according to our model, differences
in TFP have very different implications for the behavior of the real interest rate.
Contrary to what is implied by a lower level of investor protection, a higher level of
TFP yields a uniformly higher path for the interest rate.12
In the example in Figure 6, the welfare of all generations is larger when investor
protection is better. But this result is not general. At date t = 0, better investor
protection always yields a higher interest rate, so that the old are better off. The
welfare of the remaining generations can be increased or decreased by better investor
protection, depending on the net effect of three factors, of which two are positive
and one is negative. A lower ξ is beneficial because it is associated with better risk
sharing. But it also induces an increase in the rental rate at all dates, which lowers
every generation’s income in the first period (since higher rates mean lower average
transfers) and raises it in the second. The net effect is negative for high enough values
of the parameter α.13
3.4 Interpretation of the results
The result we have just described, i.e. that for closed economies poorer investor pro-
tection is generally associated with higher growth, is due to the fact that lowering
the level of protection induces a transfer of resources away from the old and towards
the young. As argued above, lowering the level of protection has an adverse impact
on the risk-sharing possibilities of entrepreneurs. This implies that for given project
size, the entrepreneurs themselves will require a higher expected return. The inter-
generational redistribution reflects the extent to which such shift in the demand of
capital leads to higher entrepreneurial income. In fact, in general equilibrium, for the
young generation to receive more, the old must suffer an income loss. Finally, the
positive impact on savings follows from the fact that young individuals have a higher
propensity to save.14
12In our model, the real interest rate reflects not only the marginal productivity of capital, but also
the degree of risk-sharing in the economy. Equation (10) implies that rt equals the marginal product,
αz¯kα−1t , plus a negative term which depends on the level of investor protection. Entrepreneurs must
be compensated for the risk induced by poor protection. This entails a lower real interest rate.
13An example in which the welfare of future generations increases with ξ is when all parameters
are as in footnote 11, except for α, that is set equal to 0.6.
14The result that in an OLG model intergenerational redistribution might lead to higher savings
is neither novel, nor specific to our environment. Under some conditions, in the familiar Diamond’s
model, a tax on capital income whose proceeds are redistributed to the young also leads to faster
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The simple demographic structure of our model implies a perfect coincidence be-
tween young and entrepreneurs, and between old and financiers. Then it is obvious
why entrepreneurs have higher saving rates. It should be clear, however, that the
scope of our result goes way beyond this simple structure. In fact, it has been argued
by many that entrepreneurs tend to have higher saving rates than the rest of the pop-
ulation.15 Our message is that as long as a worsening of investor protection induces
a redistribution from individuals with low marginal propensities to save (outside in-
vestors) to individuals with high propensities (entrepreneurs), the correlation between
investor protection and growth is not as trivial as a partial equilibrium model of in-
vestment would make us think. The reason, once again, is that such redistribution is
going to have a positive effect on the supply of capital.
3.5 Robustness of the results: An assessment
A particular feature of our model is that the fraction of entrepreneurs in the economy
is fixed. All projects are financed at all times, regardless of the level of investor
protection. This may matter. One can think of simple variations of our setup, in which
changes in the level of investor protection have an impact on capital accumulation
via changes in the number of entrepreneurs.
In Appendix C we consider one such variation. We allow production to depend
on labor as well as capital, and young individuals to choose whether to become en-
trepreneurs or to work for a wage; the fraction of entrepreneurs is an equilibrium
outcome. Poorer investor protection can now be accommodated to some degree by
an increase in the fraction of entrepreneurs. This increase will lower the capital avail-
able to each entrepreneur. In turn, this will mitigate the increase in risk borne by
the entrepreneurs themselves, and so lower their expected income. We show that
the economy does adjust along this new margin. However, in general, the negative
association between investor protection and capital accumulation still holds.
A different model could allow for credit rationing. Consider our baseline model,
but assume that running a project requires incurring a fixed cost and that individuals
are heterogeneous with respect to its magnitude. If an agent’s cost is too high for his
project to be financed, he will resort to a subsistence activity that yields a constant
outcome. In this environment an improvement in investor protection may increase the
capital accumulation. However, the implications for other endogenous quantities such as interest
rate and welfare, are radically different. We thank an anonymous referee for making this observation.
According to us, the novelty of our contribution lies in the mechanism that triggers the redistribution.
15For example, see Gentry and Hubbard (2000).
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size of the entrepreneurial sector. The net effect on capital accumulation, however, is
still uncertain. With a larger entrepreneurial sector each entrepreneur will bear less
risk and will receive a lower return. In turn, this implies that he will save less.
Our conclusion is that the supply effect is more general than might be thought
based only on our baseline model.
In the introduction, we mentioned that our paper is not the first to investigate
the effect of moral hazard on capital accumulation. Among the studies that have
addressed the same question, the one by Khan and Ravikumar (2001) is most similar
to ours. Thus it is striking that their results are very different. Also in their setup,
the introduction of moral hazard leads to imperfect risk-sharing. Its effect on capital
accumulation, however, is of the opposite sign. In our framework the positive impact
on savings that is associated poorer risk-sharing, is induced by a redistribution of
resources to the advantage of agents with higher propensity to save. By assuming
that agents are infinitely-lived, Khan and Ravikumar (2001) rule out this mechanism.
In their setup, there is no distinction between entrepreneurs and owners of capital.
It appears that some heterogeneity in the propensity to save is a necessary condition
for a model with infinitely-lived agents to generate results qualitatively similar to
ours. Finally, note that while we focus on short-term contracts, Khan and Ravikumar
(2001) allow for long-term contracts. Short-term contracts ignore the adverse effect
that higher savings today (higher capital tomorrow) has on the provision of incentives
for future generations. As discussed in Appendix A, long-term contracts do take this
effect into account. In the same appendix we show that even in an OLG model, if
there exist infinitely-lived institutions that provide individuals with lifetime optimal
risk sharing and financing contracts, then moral hazard invariably leads to lower
capital accumulation. We also argue that such contracts will be feasible only under
very restrictive assumptions.
4 The role of international capital mobility
In this section we consider a small open economy with no restrictions on capital flows.
We allow the old to lend to foreigners, and the intermediaries to borrow from abroad.
The interest rate is simply the rate prevailing internationally, and any difference
between domestic demand and supply of capital is closed by an instantaneous flow of
capital. Indeed, the economy is always in steady state.
Since the world-wide supply of capital is infinitely elastic, the general equilibrium
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effect on supply is absent. Poorer investor protection invariably translates into do-
mestic entrepreneurs demanding less capital. In turn, this implies a lower domestic
supply of capital and lower steady state levels for capital and output.
Let kd be the capital demanded by domestic intermediaries, and employed in
production, and let ks be the total capital supplied by the currently old generation.
The difference ks − kd corresponds to the net outflow of capital from the domestic
economy, i.e. to the deficit on the capital account. Proposition 3 establishes that,
provided the level of investor protection is beyond a certain threshold, poorer investor
protection is associated with a larger deficit (lower surplus) on the capital account.
Proposition 3 There exist unique capital levels k∗ and k∗∗, with 0 < k∗∗ < k∗, such
that:
1. If kd ≶ k∗ then ks − kd ≷ 0;
2. If kd ≶ k∗∗ then
∂(ks−kd)
∂ξ ≶ 0.
Proof. 1. Given a level of capital in domestic production kd, we know from
Section 3 that the level of capital supplied by the old generation is determined by
the market-clearing condition ks = ks
(
kd
)
≡ κ (r)
[
z¯f
(
kd
)
− (r + δ) kd
]
, for some
function κ. Since κ (r) is a constant, ks
(
kd
)
has the same shape as the intermediary’s
budget constraint, which was introduced previously. Figure 7 plots this function
together with the 45 degree line. Notice that the vertical difference between ks
(
kd
)
and the 45 degree line corresponds to the net capital outflow from the domestic
economy. Define k∗ such that k∗ = ks (k∗). It follows that k∗ > 0 exists and is
unique. The first part of the proposition then follows.
2. Note that, by Proposition 1, kd = D(r, ξ) is strictly decreasing in ξ. Therefore
kd ≤ D(r, 0).16 Now define k∗∗ such that ∂ks (k∗∗) /∂kd = 1. It follows that k∗∗ > 0
exists and is unique. Clearly k∗∗ maximizes ks − kd, and k∗∗ < k∗. For kd ≶ k∗∗ we
have ∂
(
ks − kd
)
/∂kd ≷ 0. Since kd is strictly decreasing in ξ, the second part of the
proposition follows.
In Section 3 we showed that poor investor protection can have a positive effect on
savings via the adjustment of the interest rate. For a closed economy, this effect can
be stronger than the negative effect on capital demand. In this section, we considered
16Without loss of generality, Figure 7 depicts the case in which k∗ < D (r, 0). Depending on r, in
particular, it is possible to have k∗ ≥ D (r, 0) as well.
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Figure 7: Net Capital Flows.
a small open economy with unrestricted capital flows. The general equilibrium effect
vanishes, leaving only the demand effect. Therefore better investor protection is
always associated with higher savings. Better investor protection also implies higher
welfare for all generations.
5 Data
In this section we provide empirical support for the key implications of our model.
We measure investor protection with the indicators introduced by La Porta et al.
(1998). Such indicators quantify explicit protections awarded to shareholders and
creditors by corporate, bankruptcy, and reorganization laws, as well as the quality of
law enforcement. We focus on four of them. The variable CR is an index aggregat-
ing different creditor rights in firm reorganization and liquidation upon default. The
indicator anti-director rights, AR, and the dummy one share-one vote, OV, are two
indices of shareholder rights geared towards measuring the ability of small sharehold-
ers to participate in decision-making. Finally, the index rule of law, RL, proxies for
the quality of law enforcement. The variables are described in detail in La Porta et al.
(1998).
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5.1 Risk sharing
The analysis in Section 3.2 implies that when investor protection is imperfect, compa-
nies’ insiders face an incentive to expropriate resources from outside investors. This
incentive is stronger the poorer is the level of investor protection. Investors’ opti-
mal response to the adverse incentives induced by imperfect protection is to require
repayment terms that are less tied to the state realizations. In other words, our
model predicts that in countries characterized by better investor protection, insiders
should be able to transfer a larger share of their idiosyncratic business risk to better-
diversified outside investors. Our purpose here is to explore the empirical association
between investor protection and risk sharing. In the absence of a direct measure of
risk sharing, we study how capital structure and ownership concentration, respec-
tively, vary with the levels of investor protection in the cross-section of countries.
The reason is that, all else being equal, the risk borne by company insiders should
be larger, the larger the company’s leverage and the higher their ownership stakes.
In fact, based on the features of standard debt and equity contracts, shareholders’
risk is increasing in leverage. The portion of this risk that shareholders actually bear
depends on how diversified their portfolios are. All else equal, the level of diversifica-
tion will be lower the higher their ownership stake. To summarize, we conjecture that
insiders’ risk sharing is poorer in countries where debt accounts for a larger fraction
of external finance and where ownership concentration is higher.
For a subset of the countries included in the investor protection data set, the
Financial Structure database assembled by Beck, Demirgu¨c¸-Kunt, and Levine includes
data on the value of outstanding debt and equity in the years 1990 through 1996.17 We
use this data to compute the average fraction of external finance that is accounted
for by debt. This fraction is negatively correlated with the indicators of investor
protection. The correlation coefficients are -0.65 for AR, and -0.39 for CR. The
corresponding p-values are 0.0358 and 0.0002, respectively. We interpret these findings
17The value of debt is computed by summing the values of the variables PRIVATEB (total amount
of outstanding domestic debt securities issued by private domestic entities) and PRIVO (claims on
private sector by deposit money banks and other financial institutions). The calculation of external
equity requires a little extra care. La Porta et al. (1998) show that for most countries a large portion
of the equity of public companies is actually held by insiders. Therefore, adopting stock market
capitalization as a measure of external equity finance would introduce a bias in our computations.
We address this issue by adopting the methodology of La Porta et al. (1997). For each of the countries,
La Porta et al. (1998) report the median fraction of equity that is cumulatively held by the three
largest shareholders in the ten largest nonfinancial domestic firms. In our calculations, we assume
that a fraction of the total equity equal to this median is actually held by insiders.
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as empirical support for our prediction.18
We now turn to ownership concentration. Our model implies that ownership
should be more concentrated in countries with poorer protection. This is exactly
what is found by La Porta et al. (1998). They report a negative correlation between
their indicators of investor protection and a measure of ownership concentration given
by the mean (or median) combined equity stake for the three largest shareholders of
the 10 largest nonfinancial, domestic, totally private and publicly traded companies.
5.2 Investor Protection, International Capital Mobility, and Growth
The second key implication of our model is that the effect of investor protection on
growth should depend on international capital mobility. The analysis carried out in
Section 3 implies that if we were to observe two countries, completely closed to capital
flows, that differed only in terms of investor protection, then we should observe the
economy with poorer protection to grow faster. That is, for perfectly closed economies,
investor protection should have a conditional negative effect on growth. In Section 4
we showed that, in the polar case in which a country is completely open to capital
flows, different levels of investor protection have no effect on rates of return. For
perfectly open economies our model implies that countries with better protection
should have higher steady states.
Most national economies are better described by models allowing for some, though
incomplete restrictions on capital flows, rather than by either of the extremes con-
sidered above. As long as some restrictions are in place, the domestic interest rate is
not completely determined by the rate prevailing abroad, and the model displays a
transition to the steady state. Lower levels of investor protection are still reflected in
lower paths of the interest rate. Most importantly, the adjustment of the interest rate
and the strength of the general equilibrium effect on supply will be larger, the tighter
are the constraints on capital flows. Thus our theory predicts that the positive effect
of investor protection on growth should be larger for countries that impose milder
restrictions on capital flows.
Our goal is to determine whether the data is consistent with the empirical pre-
diction just outlined. We first conduct a statistical analysis of cross-sectional data on
18Our decision to combine bonds and bank loans in one measure of debt may bias our results. The
reason is that the risk sharing properties of the two instruments might be different. We refer to the
view that sees banks as effective risk-sharing providers. As an alternative measure of leverage, we
considered the ratio between the value of outstanding bonds and total market finance (i.e. the sum
of bonds and equity finance). We continue to find a robust negative correlation between this measure
and the different indicators of investor protection.
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growth, investor protection, and openness, and then explore the development experi-
ences of South Korea and India.
5.2.1 Cross-country evidence
To build a measure of restrictions on capital movements we follow Alesina et al. (1994)
and Lewis (1996). For each country, we construct a time-series dummy based on the
IMF’s Annual Report on Exchange Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions. The
dummy variable takes the value of 1 for a given country in a given year if the IMF
finds evidence of restrictions on payments on capital transactions for that country-
year pair. Such restrictions include both taxes and quantity restrictions on the trade
of foreign assets. We compute the average of this dummy over the sample period
to obtain a measure of the fraction of time each country imposed restrictions on
international capital transactions; this is our variable RCT . There are few countries
for which the dummy varies significantly over time. RCT is equal to one for just over
one-third of the countries in our data, and is roughly uniformly distributed for the
rest. Since RCT does not capture either the kind or the severity of capital market
restrictions imposed, or even whether the type of restrictions imposed remain constant
over time, it is a very rough measure of restrictions on capital transactions.19
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Figure 8: Output Growth and Investor Protection.
19Recently, Dennis Quinn has constructed alternative measures of international financial regulations
by coding the provisions of domestic and international laws of 64 countries from 1950 to 1997. (See
Quinn (1997) for a detailed illustration of his methodology). Quinn’s measure of capital market
restrictions, CAPITAL, accounts for the severity of the restrictions at the cost of a greater discretion
in construction of the indicator. We have repeated our analysis, substituting CAPITAL for RCT,
and find that the results are very similar. Given the positive correlation between the two measures,
this is not too surprising.
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Figure 8 illustrates how the relation between investor protection and growth varies
across closed and open economies. In the two panels we plot two measures of investor
protection against the growth rate of GDP per worker for two sets of countries: those
with values of RCT that belong to the first quartile of the cross-sectional distribution
of this variable (“open” countries), and those whose values fall in the top quartile
(“closed”).20 Our model predicts that the correlation between investor protection
and growth should be higher among open economies. The figures are consistent with
this prediction. For closed economies, the slopes are not significantly different from
zero.21
Figure 8 also identifies the countries that are mostly responsible for the sample
correlations. Among open economies, the fast growers have the right institutions:
Hong-Kong, Malaysia, Indonesia, and Singapore. Among the closed ones, instead,
there are several with good institutions that do not grow nearly as fast. What is
striking is that the fast growers among the closed economies are those with poor
investor protection: Korea, Taiwan, and Thailand. Obviously we are not the first to
partition East-Asian economies in fast- and slow-growers. Table 3-14 in Maddison
(2001) does it in a very effective way. What we find remarkable is the way in which
the differences in growth rates are associated with differences in investor protection
and openness, a way that is quite consistent with our theory.
In order to condition on other potential sources of cross-country variation in
growth rates, we now consider a standard growth regression framework. Our regres-
sors are the indicators of investor protection and of restrictions on capital transactions,
20The IMF does not provide data on capital restrictions for Taiwan. Nevertheless, based upon
the capital account liberalization chronology for this country, described in detail in Kaminsky and
Schmukler (2003), we classify it as closed and include it in the plots. As it is the case for Korea,
Taiwan completed the liberalization of international capital flows only at the end of the 1990’s. The
significance of our results is not sensitive to the inclusion of Taiwan; indeed, we do not include it in
our regression analysis.
21In Figure 8 we restrict our attention to the relationships between growth and the variables AR
and CR, respectively. We think that these are the two indicators that are more likely to reflect the
level of overall investor protection. However, we recognize that the role of RL, which proxies for
the level of law enforcement, may also be important. Therefore we computed a summary measure
of protection using principal components. In our case, the principal components are four orthogonal
vectors that are computed as linear combinations of the four series AR, CR, RL, and OV . The
summary measure is the weighted average of the components, where each weight is the proportion of
the variation in the original series that is explained by the related component. Plotting the growth
rates against the new measure yields results that are similar to those illustrated in Figure 8. That is,
for open economies, the correlation coefficient is significantly higher. In the regression analysis that
follows we consider all four protection indicators.
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as well as their interactions:
GRi = α+ φ
′IPi + γRCTi + ϕ
′ (IPi ×RCTi) + θ
′Xi + εi,
where GRi is the average annual growth rate of income for country i, IPi is a set of
indicators of investor protection, RCTi is a measure of restrictions on capital trans-
actions, Xi is a vector of other conditioning variables believed to be important to
account for growth, and εi is the error term.
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When the restrictions γ = 0 and ϕ = 0 are imposed, the model relates investor
protection to income growth without any reference to the mechanism through which
the former influences the latter. In other words, the restricted regression summarizes
the combined evidence of La Porta et al. (1997), King and Levine (1993a,b), and
others in a reduced-form way. Their finding that investor protection fosters financial
market development, which in turn is positively associated with growth, corresponds
to a significantly positive estimate of φ.
Our theory suggests that the overall positive effect of investor protection on growth
may be decomposed into a positive effect (our partial equilibrium demand effect),
captured by φ in the unrestricted regression, and a negative effect that depends on
the restrictions on international capital movements (our general equilibrium effect on
supply), captured by ϕ.
In deciding which variables to include in Xi we choose to remain anchored to our
theory as much as possible. Therefore we only include the natural logarithm of initial
income as a conditioning variable.23 Our income data is real GDP per worker from
the Penn World Tables, version 6.1. Our set of countries corresponds to the 49 in
La Porta et al. (1998) except for Germany, which has missing income data for most
years, and for Jordan and Venezuela, which have missing data on creditor rights. In
the unrestricted regression we also drop Switzerland, Zimbabwe, and Taiwan, because
the IMF did not include them in its survey in every year. The time span of our sample
is from 1967 to 1996, the largest possible for all 49 countries in the La Porta et al.
(1998) data set.
22Notice that our specification is more general than one that uses income level as dependent variable.
As noticed by Mankiw et al. (1992), if the dependent variable was the level of income instead of its
growth rate, we would implicitly assume that countries deviate only randomly from their steady-
states. Our approach can also account for out-of-steady state dynamics.
23The results in Table 1 did not change in any important way when we included in Xi schooling
measures based upon the Barro and Lee (1996) data set (we tried both the log of average secondary
schooling and the log of average total schooling). With log schooling and log initial income, our Xi
becomes the “simple information conditioning set” considered by Beck et al. (2000a,b).
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Table 1: Output Growth, Investor Protection and Capital Restrictions
Dependent Variable: Average annual growth rate of real GDP per worker 1967-1996
Log Real GDP per worker 1967 -0.01392b -0.0094c
(0.00568) (0.00562)
One share-one vote (OV) 0.00854c 0.00158
(0.0046) (0.0085)
Antidirector rights (AR) -0.00048 0.00199
(0.00125) (0.0017)
Creditor rights (CR) 0.00149 0.00998a
(0.00174) (0.00353)
Rule of law (RL) 0.004195a 0.00366
(0.00134) (0.00237)
Restrictions 0.04768c
on capital transactions (RCT) (0.02538)
OV×RCT 0.0091
(0.01362)
AR×RCT -0.0053c
(0.00298)
CR×RCT -0.0103b
(0.00422)
RL×RCT -0.00101
(0.00237)
Constant 0.1209b 0.054
(0.04892) (0.0546)
Number of countries 46 43
Adjusted R2 0.326 0.345
Note: White robust standard errors in parenthesis.
Sources: Heston et al. (2002), La Porta et al. (1998) and IMF (Annual Report on Exchange
Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions, 1967-1996).
aSignificant at 1%; bSignificant at 5%; cSignificant at 10%.
We report our results in Table 1. The first column refers to the restricted re-
gression. Consistent with the existing literature, we find that two of the measures of
investor protection have significantly positive coefficients. The estimated impact of
investor protection is large. One standard deviation increase in RL is predicted to
increase the growth rate of income by 1.12%, i.e. almost 50% of the average annual
growth rate in the sample, 2.3%. Since we find a significant effect when conditioning
on initial incomes, we conclude that countries with better investor protection also
tend to have higher income levels (not only growth rates).
The second column presents estimates of the unrestricted model. All four coeffi-
cients of the investor protection variables are positive (although with varying degrees
of statistical significance) and three of the coefficients of the interaction terms are
negative. The fourth coefficient is positive, but the p-value for the hypothesis that it
is equal to zero is 0.51. These results are consistent with our theory in the following
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sense. If a country has never imposed restrictions on capital transactions over the
relevant time period, so that RCT = 0, then the data shows that investor protection
is clearly positively associated with growth. To the extent that RCT = 0 corresponds
to the highest degree of openness in the data, our model suggests that we interpret
the positive estimates of φ as capturing the partial equilibrium effect on demand. As
RCT increases towards 1, however, the regression results show that the overall effect
of investor protection on growth diminishes. This is consistent with an increased
importance of the general equilibrium effect on supply.
Creditor rights seem to have the largest impact on growth. The coefficients of CR
and CR × RCT are statistically significant, and the p-value for the null hypothesis
that they are jointly insignificant is 0.028. In the absence of capital market restrictions
(i.e. RCT = 0), a one standard deviation increase in CR is predicted to increase the
growth rate by 1.38%. At the other extreme (i.e., RCT = 1), the predicted effect
of the same change is actually a small decline in growth, −0.04%; the supply effect
is stronger than the more familiar demand effect. The strength of the interaction
with RCT explains why, in the restricted regression, CR appeared unimportant for
growth.24
The findings are similar, but less statistically and economically significant, for
the impact of RL. The coefficients of RL and of its interaction with RCT are not
individually statistically significant, but the hypothesis that both are zero has a p-
value of 0.09. A one standard deviation increase in RL is predicted to increase growth
by 0.97% when RCT = 0 and by 0.71% when RCT = 1. This is consistent with a
significant positive coefficient in the restricted model.25
The reader may wonder whether the regression results are driven by outliers. In
Figure 9 we plot the partial relationships between income growth and the interaction
terms AR×RCT and CR×RCT , respectively. It appears that outliers do not play
any significant role. The sign of the relationships seem to hold for the broad sample
of countries.
One would also like to know whether our results are robust to the choices of
regression specification and data set. In this respect, it is helpful to recall the results
of other recent studies, namely Arteta et al. (2001) and Chinn and Ito (2002), that
24The fact that OV is marginally significant in the first regression also appears to be an artifact of
the restrictions imposed. In the unrestricted model, the coefficients of both OV and OV ×RCT are
insignificant, and the p-value for the hypothesis that both are zero is 0.24.
25The results also suggest the effect of AR on growth operates through the supply effect, but the
evidence is weak. The coefficients on AR and AR×RCT are small and statistically insignificant: the
hypothesis that they are both zero has a p-value of 0.22.
27
ARG
AUS
AUT
BEL
BRA
CAN
CHL
COL
DNK
ECU
EGY
SP
FIN
FRA
GBR
GRC
HKG
IDN
IND
IRL
ISR
ITA
JPN
KEN
KOR
LKA
MEX
MYS
NGA
NLD
NOR
NZL
PAK
PER
PHL
PRT
SGP
SWE
THA
TUR
URYUSA
ZAF
−
.0
2
0
.0
2
.0
4
.0
6
In
c
o
m
e
 G
ro
w
th
 1
9
6
7
−
1
9
9
6
−1 0 1 2
Residuals ARxRCT
ARG
AUS
AUT
BEL
BRA
CAN
CHL
COL
DNK
ECU
EGY
ESP
FIN
FRA
GBR
GRC
HKG
IDN
IND
IRL
ISR
ITA
JPN
KEN
KOR
LKA
MEX
MYS
NGA
NLD
NOR
NZL
PAK
PER
PHL
PRT
SGP
SWE
THA
TUR
URY USA
ZAF
−
.0
2
0
.0
2
.0
4
.0
6
In
c
o
m
e
 G
ro
w
th
 1
9
6
7
−
1
9
9
6
−1 −.5 0 .5 1
Residuals CRxRCT
Figure 9: Conditional relationship between income growth and interaction term
employ alternative specifications (in particular, different conditioning variables) and
data sets. Differently from ours, the ultimate goal of these studies is to investigate the
statistical relationship between capital account liberalization and various measures of
development, and to understand whether such relationship depends on the quality of
institutions.26 In spite of this difference, their results can be reinterpreted as showing
that the magnitude of the (positive) impact of investor protection on development
depends negatively on the extent of capital restrictions.
5.2.2 India versus South Korea
We now take a closer look at the development experiences of two countries: South
Korea and India. Korea is one of the post-WWII growth miracles. During our sample
period, its per-capita GDP grew at an astonishing 6.06% annual compounded rate,
among the highest in the world. Despite a lower initial level of PPP-adjusted per-
capita GDP, India grew only at a 2.95% rate, a slightly above average performance in
our sample. What accounts for such difference? As pointed out by Maddison (2001),
country growth performances in Far East Asia in the second post-war period have
varied widely. A large literature has tried to explain this heterogeneity. Most studies
argue that the variation was caused either by differences in government policies, or
by other idiosyncratic factors. We chose to focus on Korea and India because there
is ample evidence suggesting that, at least from a qualitative point of view, growth-
promoting policies enacted in these two countries were very similar. We suggest that
the relevant difference between the two is in terms of institutions and, in particular,
26The dependent variable in Chinn and Ito (2002) is the change in indicators of financial market
development rather than the growth rate of income.
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in terms of investor protection.
India and Korea appear to differ greatly in terms of investor protection. According
to legal scholars, India, a British colony until 1947, belongs to the common-law family.
Korea’s laws and institutions, instead, are inspired by the civil law tradition, and are
modelled on the German example. As a result, Korea ranks significantly lower than
India in terms of both the AR and CR indicators.27 These observations lead us
to conclude that India is more likely than Korea to provide outside investors with
effective protection from the exploitation of insiders.
Both the Korean and the Indian governments have played very active roles in the
allocation of credit to firms. A common theme of their interventions in the financial
sector has been the creation of rents for specific manufacturing sectors. Such rents
were created by inducing banks and other financial intermediaries to keep the returns
to investors artificially low in order to provide selected industries with credit at very
favorable terms.28 This policy was feasible thanks to very tight controls on capital
flows.29 Such controls were gradually eased during the last years of our sample period.
However, there is no doubt that domestic investors were barred from investing abroad
during most of the period. Domestic capital was kept captive.30 Referring to Korea,
Dornbush and Park (1987) argues that “... By paying depositors low real interest
rates and by controlling capital outflows, the government implicitly taxed depositors,
then channelled the proceeds to favored sectors for investment.” Then, why did such
a policy, often referred to as one of financial repression, succeed in promoting growth
in Korea but fail in India?
The literature provides several tentative answers to this question. Cho and Vittas
(1995), for example, argue that the Korean government made better choices in terms
27However, India scores slightly lower in terms of law enforcement. Our impression, based upon
anecdotal evidence, is that investors are overall better protected in India. When we performed
the principal component analysis described in footnote 21, India did come out has having a better
summary index of investor protection than Korea (and also better than Thailand and Taiwan).
28There is ample consensus on the view that the credit policies enacted in India and Korea were
very similar, at least in spirit. For example, according to Cho and Vittas (1995), this is the general
view that emerged from the World Bank research project titled “Effectiveness of Credit Policies in
East Asian Countries”.
29Both Korea and India are in the first quartile of the cross-country distribution of our measures of
openness to international capital flows. The IMF finds that both countries had restrictions in place
in all years of our sample. Therefore our variable RCT takes value 1 (the maximum value) for both.
The measure proposed by Quinn yields a consistent characterization. The average of his indicator
CAPITAL, which ranges from 0 (completely closed) to 4 (perfectly open), is 1.4 for India and 1.7 for
Korea.
30A further confirmation that this was the case for Korea is provided by Dornbush and Park (1987).
They report data from the IMF’s International Financial Statistics showing that in the 80’s nonbank
Korean residents had almost no external deposit holdings.
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of which sectors to privilege. Others have argued that, differently from their Indian
counterparts, Korean firms have been subject to foreign competition, with the result
of achieving higher productive efficiency. Our stand is that these explanations fail to
account for another crucial difference between the two development experiences: the
one between saving rates.
A high national saving rate is a well-known feature of the Korean growth experi-
ence, and it helps explain how Korea was able to sustain a very high investment rate
since the late 1960’s. Precisely, Young (1995) identifies capital accumulation as the
key ingredient behind the tremendous growth of Korea’s GDP. The average Korean
saving rate in our sample was 28%, while the rate for India was just 19%.31 Moreover,
Korea’s rate was substantially higher in any single year. The size of the gap between
saving rates looks even more dramatic when we consider that, according to several
measures, average real interest rates have been higher in India than in Korea. The
IMF’s International Financial Statistics (IFS) provide yearly measures of several key
nominal interest rates for developing countries. Unfortunately, rates on time deposits
are available only for Korea. Dornbush and Park (1987) comment on this data is that
“... Although Korea is often cited as an example of successful financial liberalization
with high and positive real interest rates mobilizing financial resources for investment
and growth, ... real rates have not been high, except in 1965-69,... The relationship
between saving and interest rates remains unresolved in Korea, just as everywhere
else.” The IFS data set, however, does contain information on prime nominal annual
lending rates of commercial banks for both countries. Real rates (i.e. nominal rates
adjusted for realized inflation) were, on average, 7% in India and only 3.2% in Korea.
One problem with this data is that it is limited to 17 observations (from 1980 to
1996). An alternative is to follow Hsieh (2002) and look at discount rates, for which
we have data for the whole sample period in the IFS.32 We find discount rates in
India to be on average significantly higher than in Korea: 2.2% versus -0.56%. How
to reconcile the behavior of saving rates with observed interest rates? Our theoretical
analysis suggests that lending rates were lower (rates of return to entrepreneurs were
higher) in Korea because risk sharing was poorer.
31We computed the saving rate in a single year exactly as in Carroll et al. (1994). It is the ratio of
nominal saving to nominal GDP, where nominal savings are given by nominal GDP minus the sum of
nominal private consumption and nominal government consumption. Nominal values are in domestic
currency. The data is drawn from the national account information contained in version 6.1 of the
Penn World Tables.
32For Korea, in particular, Hsieh (2002) finds discount rates to be approximately equal to deposit
rates.
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In both countries, the purpose of the government was to entice entrepreneurs to
invest, by allowing them to borrow at low rates. Our point is that in setting those
rates, either government must have taken demand conditions into account. The higher
the undiversifiable risk entrepreneurs were subject to, the lower the rates needed to
be in order to accomplish the government’s objective. Since, as we argue below, the
institutional framework in India provided entrepreneurs with better opportunities
for risk-sharing, the latter required a lower return on investment than their Korean
analogues. This implies that the Indian government could allow interest rates on loans
to be higher than in Korea, thereby limiting the extent of the income redistribution
in favor of the entrepreneurial sector. Finally, this contributed to keep the saving rate
in India relatively low.
We have already argued that measuring risk sharing is not an easy task. How-
ever, the proxies introduced in Section 5.1 suggest that Korean entrepreneurs had a
harder time sharing business risk with the rest of the population. Consider capital
structure choices first. Korean firms’ leverage has been much higher than their In-
dian counterparts’ throughout our sample period.33 It has been repeatedly argued
in the literature that the Korean government kept ready to avoid that this resulted
in (possibly inefficient) bankruptcies. However, even if firms were provided insurance
against extreme events, a larger fraction of fixed income claims must have implied
greater income risk for shareholders. The fraction of this risk that was actually borne
by them depends on their ability to diversify their portfolios. In order to assess
the diversification opportunities available to insiders, we consider data on ownership
concentration. In general, the presence of pyramidal schemes and intra-group cross
shareholdings makes it inaccurate to measure cash-flow rights by simply considering
direct shareholdings.34 When the purpose is to compute the total cash-flow rights of
ultimate owners, direct cash flow-rights constitute only a lower bound. That is, the
presence of both pyramids and cross-holdings lead to the underestimation of owner-
33This fact has been documented by several authors, using different data. Claessens et al. (2000)
compute leverage ratios using data drawn from the annual reports of the companies listed on the
major stock exchanges, as gathered by the Worldscope Database. They find that during the period
1988-96 Korean companies were the most leveraged in their large sample of developed and developing
countries. This ranking is preserved even when the last two years of the sample, characterized by
an accelerated debt build-up in Korea, are excluded. Indian companies instead lie in the left tail of
the cross-country distribution of leverage. A similar picture emerges when we consider the data on
the ratio of debt to external finance introduced in Section 5.1. The fraction of total external finance
accounted for by debt is 83% in Korea and 67% in India.
34A pyramidal structure allows an individual to have cash-flow rights on a company via ownership
of a third company. The simplest case is the one in which a person has an ownership stake in a firm,
which in turn holds a stake in a third company. The simplest example of cross-shareholdings is given
by the case in which two companies hold ownership stakes in each other.
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ship stakes. We argue that in the case of Korea, the bias introduced by using direct
rights is particularly large. The reason is that cross shareholdings are a pervasive
feature of chaebols, Korean business groups. Nam et al. (2001) find that in 1997 the
average direct ownership fraction of the largest shareholder of the 10 biggest chaebols
was a mere 10.29%.35 When properly accounting for cross shareholding, Nam et al.
(2001) find that the figure climbs to a staggering 39.58%. The available evidence
suggests a very different scenario for Indian firms. Goswami (2002) writes that in
India “... During the industrial expansion of the 1970s and 1980s, the average share
ownership of the controlling groups declined to 15 percent.” Bertrand et al. (2002)
report that in their sample the average equity stake of directors was 16.7% (7.45%
for business groups and 22.99% for stand-alone firms).36 Unfortunately for our anal-
ysis, these figures refer to direct holdings only. This makes it hard to compare them
with the numbers reported by Nam et al. (2001) about Korean firms. However, if,
as it seems plausible, in the Bertrand et al. (2002) data set the directors include
the largest shareholders, their indirect cash-flow rights must be lower than the direct
ones. Therefore, 14.9% (2×7.45%) constitutes an upper bound for the total cash-flow
rights of directors in Indian business groups. Our conclusion is that, at least for large
groups, the concentration of cash flow rights was much higher in Korea than India.
The difference in risk sharing that we have documented is clearly consistent with
our theory. Given the evidence on investor protection, our model predicts that Indian
entrepreneurs should be able to share their business risk with the population, to a
larger extent than their Korean counterparts.
To summarize, we believe that the comparison of India’s and South Korea’s de-
velopment experiences illustrates quite well the key mechanism at work in our model.
The evidence tells us that during the sample period both countries have placed consid-
erable restrictions on capital flows, and that India has better protected the interests
of investors than Korea. In turn, this difference in investor protection seems to be re-
flected in a substantial difference in the opportunities for risk diversification available
to entrepreneurs in the two countries. The data also tells us that during the same
period Korea grew much faster and had much higher saving rates than India, despite
lower real interest rates. Our theory provides a rationalization for this set of findings.
35The result is consistent with what reported by La Porta et al. (1998). They find that the average
direct ownership fraction of the three largest shareholders of the 10 biggest chaebols is 23%.
36Bertrand et al. (2002) draw their data from Prowess, a database that includes annual report
information for Indian companies between 1989 and 1999. Their sample contains about 18,500 firm-
year observations.
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The purpose of both the Korean and the Indian government was to direct funds to
the entrepreneurial sector at favorable terms, with the purpose of fostering invest-
ment in given industries. Real interest rates (returns to entrepreneurs) in Korea were
lower (higher), because entrepreneurs faced more risk and therefore needed greater
incentives in order to invest. In turn, this has implied the distribution of larger rents
to the entrepreneurial sector. Finally, given the higher saving rate of entrepreneurs,
this led to higher saving and faster capital accumulation.
6 Conclusion
In this paper we have introduced investor protection in the familiar two-period OLG
model of capital accumulation. The level of protection afforded by financiers is mea-
sured by the cost a borrower would have to pay to misreport his cash-flow.
Our model produces several interesting implications. First, the structure of fi-
nancial claims adjusts endogenously to changes in investor protection. We show that
the risk sharing implied by optimal financing contracts is increasing in the level of
protection. We find empirical support for this prediction. In countries where outside
investors are better protected, equity claims are more prevalent, and firm ownership
is less concentrated.
Second, we show that the overall effect of protection on capital accumulation can
be decomposed into a positive effect on the demand for capital, and a negative general
equilibrium effect on supply. The strength of the supply effect is greater the tighter
are the restrictions on international capital mobility. Therefore, our model predicts
that the positive effect of investor protection on growth should be larger for countries
that impose lower restrictions on capital flows. We also find the data to be consistent
with this prediction.
Our analysis can be extended in several potentially interesting ways. One is to
introduce imperfect contract enforceability. This is of interest because some empirical
measures of investor protection that appear to be associated with growth reflect the
ability of the legal system to ensure that contracts are honored. It would also be
interesting to introduce inside equity in the model, with the purpose of studying how
the relative importance of inside and outside sources of finance vary with the degree
of investor protection. Finally, endogeneizing the level of investor protection would
open the possibility of understanding which features of actual economies can account
for the large cross-country variation in this variable.
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We can also ask whether our analysis provides any insight into the recent wave of
accounting-related scandals in the United States. Interpreting these events, journalists
and commentators appear to describe the breakdown of a separating equilibrium in a
simple adverse selection model. They argue that firms involved in the scandals were
inefficient firms whose managers found it optimal to mimic the behavior of better-
performing companies. Our model suggests a very different interpretation. Suppose
that the strong economy of the ’90s led to an increase in what the model describes
with zh, but that incentives in contracts did not adjust immediately, or did not adjust
enough. The model suggests that the firms involved in the scandals are actually
the ones that had been performing well, and in which insiders found it profitable to
appropriate some of the cash flows, disguising this appropriation by misreporting their
accounting numbers. These firms are now (i.e., t + 1) less valuable than they were
earlier thought to be, not necessarily because they are less productive than expected
(although this, too, would be consistent with the model, i.e., zt+1 = zl). Instead, the
reason is that contractual incentives lagging business conditions made taking a chance
at appropriating large parts of firm resources optimal for firm managers. The effect of
managers’ expropriation on firm value was aggravated by the fact that such activity
was inefficient, in that resources were used up in the hiding process, so that value
concealed from investors did not translate one to one into higher managerial wealth.
Accounts of the recent history of companies such as Tyco and Global Crossing lend
plausibility to this idea.
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A Long-term contracts
In this section we characterize the allocation that would be chosen by a social planner
that attaches a weight γt, γ ∈ (0, 1), to the utility of the generation born in period
t. Importantly, we show that this allocation satisfies Rogerson (1985)’s condition on
the intertemporal allocation of consumption. By construction, any market mecha-
nism that relies on one-period financing contracts violates this condition. Therefore,
the allocation that we have studied in Section 3 falls inside the Constrained-Pareto
frontier. However, following an argument introduced by Allen (1985), we show that
two-period contracts actually collapse to one-period arrangements if we introduce the
possibility of unmonitored borrowing and lending.
Figure 10 describes the timing of the lifetime relationship between the planner
and an individual born at time t. At the beginning of time t, the planner makes a
capital advance kt; its investment yields ztf (kt). Then, the agent reports zl or zh,
and surrenders zhf (kt) or zlf (kt) to the planner. Finally, the planner assigns a life-
time consumption allocation
(
cyi,t (zˆt) , c
o
i,t+1 (zˆt)
)
i=h,l
. For every t, the pair (cyh,t, c
y
l,t)
denotes the consumption allocation intended for agents born at time t, conditional on
high and low reports, respectively. The pair (coh,t, c
o
l,t) denotes the time t consumption
allocation intended for agents born at time t − 1, again conditional on their report
(issued at time t− 1).
Given initial capital, k0 > 0, the planner’s optimization problem is:
max
co
0
,
{
kt+1,(cyi,t,coi,t+1)i=h,l
}∞
t=0
γ−1u (co0) +
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t=0
γt
{
ρ
[
u
(
cyh,t
)
+ βu
(
coh,t+1
)]
+
(1− ρ)
[
u
(
cyl,t
)
+ βu
(
col,t+1
)]}
,
subject to
ρ
(
cyh,t + c
o
h,t
)
+ (1− ρ)
(
cyl,t + c
o
l,t
)
= z¯f (kt) + (1− δ) kt − kt+1, (12)
u
(
cyh,t
)
+ βu
(
coh,t+1
)
≥ u
(
cyl,t + ξ∆f (kt)
)
+ βu
(
col,t+1
)
. (13)
Equation (12) is the resource constraint. At all t, total consumption must be equal
to production less gross investment. Condition (13) is the incentive compatibility
constraint, conditional on high output. It is easy to show that (13) will always bind
at the optimum. To see why, assume the contrary. Then the solution can be obtained
ignoring this constraint altogether. By strict concavity of u, full insurance is necessary
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Figure 10: Timing in Planner’s Problem.
for optimality. That is, cyt ≡ c
y
h,t = c
y
l,t and c
o
t ≡ c
o
h,t = c
o
l,t for every t. But this violates
(13).
Start with the ξ = 0 case. In Section 3 we argued that, for ξ = 0, our model is a
simple extension of Diamond’s, the only difference being that in our model individuals
face idiosyncratic risk. In this case, the planner’s solution is to provide full insurance.
The presence of idiosyncratic risk becomes immaterial to the determination of the
efficient allocation. In fact, the following holds at all times:
u′(cyt ) = β[z¯f
′(kt+1) + (1− δ)]u
′(cot+1)
and
u′(cyt ) =
β
γ
u′(cot ).
The steady state capital stock is then determined by the modified golden rule condi-
tion
z¯f ′(k) =
1
γ
− (1− δ),
where z¯ = ρzh + (1− ρ)zl.
Now consider the more interesting case, ξ > 0. Let λt and µt be the multipliers
associated with the constraints (12) and (13), respectively. Then the planner’s optimal
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resource allocation satisfies the following conditions:
u′
(
cyh,t
)
u′
(
coh,t+1
) = βλt
γλt+1
,
(1− ρ)u′
(
cyl,t
)
− µtu
′
(
cyl,t + ξ∆f (kt)
)
[(1− ρ)− µt]u′
(
col,t+1
) = βλt
γλt+1
,
where µt > 0. Given our assumption that u
′′ < 0, it follows that
u′
(
cyl,t
)
u′
(
col,t+1
) < u′
(
cyh,t
)
u′
(
coh,t+1
) . (14)
Condition (14) is the restatement of a general result due to Rogerson (1985). Given
the low state, individuals consume too much in the first period of their lives. If they
could, they would transfer resources to the second period of their lives.
A further necessary condition for optimality is that
γ
λt+1
λt
[
z¯f ′ (kt+1) + 1− δ
]
= 1 + γ
µt+1
λt
ξ∆f ′ (kt+1)u
′
(
cyl,t+1 + ξ∆f (kt+1)
)
.
Since µt+1 > 0, it follows that
γ
λt+1
λt
[
z¯f ′ (kt+1) + 1− δ
]
> 1.
This condition implies that the steady state capital stock satisfies
z¯f ′(k) >
1
γ
− (1− δ).
Hence, with private information the social planner accumulates less capital than would
be accumulated under symmetric information. This result is analogous to the one
reached by Khan and Ravikumar (2001); the intuition is the same. When choosing
the level of investment, the planner recognizes that a larger capital stock will make the
incentive compatibility constraint harder to satisfy for future generations. In other
words, a larger capital stock will imply less risk sharing, and thus, lower marginal
returns. The optimal response is to choose a lower capital stock than would be
chosen if ξ = 0.
In the basic 2-period OLG model, it is well-known that there exists a simple
market mechanism that results in consumption being allocated just as a benevolent
planner would allocate it. Does such a mechanism exist in our more general model?
For ξ = 0, it exists, and it is very simple. It involves introducing intermediaries that
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borrow from the old and lend to the young via a contract that offers full insurance
to entrepreneurs. When ξ > 0, the answer is less obvious. It is clear, however, that
such a mechanism would have to satisfy condition (14). If individuals can commit
to interacting with only one intermediary during their life-times, then it is easy to
prove that (14) holds. If individuals cannot commit to exclusive lifetime contracts,
then the allocation will satisfy (14) only if financial institutions can perfectly monitor
the agents’ use of alternative borrowing and lending opportunities. In fact, consider
the case studied by Allen (1985), in which individuals can engage in unmonitored
intertemporal borrowing and lending at a given rate r. After receiving the first-period
allocations from their intermediary, individuals will trade until their consumption
allocations satisfy
u′
(
cyl,t
)
u′
(
col,t+1
) = u′
(
cyh,t
)
u′
(
coh,t+1
) = β (1 + r) .
Thus, with unmonitored borrowing and lending, any two-period contract collapses to
a sequence of one-period contracts of the type considered in the main body of the
paper.37
B Derivation of the Optimal Contracting Problem (P2)
In this section we cast the relationship between lender and entrepreneur as a mes-
sage game with asymmetric information. Instead of surrendering their output and
receiving a transfer in return, entrepreneurs simply pay a contingent return on the
capital borrowed. We show that the Constrained-Pareto Optimal Contract in this
environment implies the same allocation as the one that solves problem (P2).
Differently from what is standard in the message game literature and similarly to
Lacker and Weinberg (1989), we assume that besides sending a message drawn from
an arbitrary space M, each entrepreneur takes an action that consists in showing
(displaying) his output to his lender. A contract at time t is now given by a scalar
kt and by a return function Rt : M× {zh, zl} → <. The crucial assumption is that
hiding, i.e. displaying an amount of output lower than the outcome of production, is
costly.38
37A similar point is made in Section 7 of Atkeson and Lucas (1992).
38We assume that an entrepreneur cannot display more output than he actually obtained. It is easy
to prove that this assumption implies no loss of generality. That is, our results would not change if,
consistently with a different notion of display, the entrepreneur could show more output than he has.
This would be the case if displaying output meant disclosing balance sheet and/or income statement
data.
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Figure 11: Timing.
By the Revelation Principle, we can restrict our attention to the case in which
M ≡ {zh, zl} and the reports are truthful. However, we do not require the amounts
displayed to be consistent with the reports. Figure 11 displays the timing. After
having observed his outcome ztf(kt), the entrepreneur makes a claim about the quality
of his project zˆt ∈ {zh, zl} and displays output in measure z˜t. Feasibility requires that
z˜l = zl and z˜h ∈ {zh, zl}. Finally, he transfers to the lender an amount Rt(zˆ, z˜)kt.
A contract at time t is a capital advance kt and a return schedule Rt(zˆ, z˜) that
solve
max
kt,z˜∈{zh,zl},Rt(zˆh,z˜)
ρv [zhf(kt)−Rt(zh, z˜)kt − (1− ξ)(zh − z˜)f(kt), rt+1]
+ (1− ρ)v [zlf(kt)−Rt(zl, zl)kt, rt+1]
subject to
ρRt(zh, z˜h) + (1− ρ)Rt(zl, zl) = rt + δ
(zh, z˜h) = arg max
zˆ,z˜∈{zh,zl}
v [zhf(kt)−Rt(zˆ, z˜)kt − (1− ξ)(zh − z˜)f(kt), rt+1] (15)
v [zlf(kt)−Rt(zl, zl)kt] ≥ v [zlf(kt)−Rt(zh, zl)kt] (16)
The deadweight loss associated with hiding cash flows in the high state is (1−ξ)∆f(kt),
i.e. a fraction (1− ξ) of the output hidden. Condition (15) requires truthful report-
ing and optimal display of output by high-outcome entrepreneurs. Condition (16)
requires truthful reporting by low-outcome entrepreneurs. Following an argument
made by Lacker and Weinberg (1989), Lemma 2 shows that optimal return schedules
are independent of the report zˆ.
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Lemma 2 For all z˜ ∈ {zh, zl}, Rt(zh, z˜) = Rt(zl, z˜) without loss of generality.
Proof. We first show that Rt(zh, zl) = Rt(zl, zl). Condition (16) implies that
Rt(zh, zl) ≥ Rt(zl, zl). If z˜h = zl, then (16) implies that −Rt(zh, zl)− (1− ξ)∆f(kt) ≥
−Rt(zl, zl)− (1− ξ)∆f(kt). In turn, this implies Rt(zh, zl) ≤ Rt(zl, zl). Otherwise, if
z˜h = zh, then −Rt(zh, zh) ≥ −Rt(zh, zl) − (1 − ξ)∆f(kt). Therefore there is no loss
in generality in imposing Rt(zh, zl) = Rt(zl, zl).
We now show that Rt(zh, zh) = Rt(zl, zh). If z˜h = zh, then (15) implies that
Rt(zl, zh) ≥ Rt(zh, zh). Otherwise, if z˜h = zl, then (15) implies −Rt(zh, zl) − (1 −
ξ)∆ ≥ −Rt(zh, zh). In either case, there is no loss in generality in imposing that
Rt(zl, zh) = Rt(zh, zh).
In light of Lemma 2, we can rewrite the optimal contracting problems as
max
kt,z˜∈{zh,zl},Rt(z˜)
ρv [zhf(kt)−Rt(z˜)kt − (1− ξ)(zh − z˜)f(kt), rt+1]
+ (1− ρ)v [zlf(kt)−Rt(zl)kt, rt+1]
subject to
ρRt(z˜h) + (1− ρ)Rt(zl) = rt + δ (17)
z˜h = arg max
z˜∈{zh,zl}
v [zhf(kt)−Rt(z˜)kt − (1− ξ)(zh − z˜)f(kt), rt+1] (18)
Lemma 3 shows that no Constrained-Pareto optimal contracts involve hiding.
Lemma 3 Hiding is never optimal, i.e. z˜h = zh.
Proof. By contradiction, assume that the optimal contract {kt, Rt(·)} implies
z˜h = zl. Consider the return schedule R
′
t such that R
′
t(zh) = R
′
t(zl) = Rt(zl). The
contract {kt, R
′
t(·)} implies z˜h = zh, satisfies (17), and provides the entrepreneur with
a strictly greater utility. This contradicts the initial assumption.
The intuition for this result is simple. The spread between the incomes of high-
and low-outcome entrepreneurs is invariant to the level of output displayed z˜f(kt).
In any contract that prescribes hiding, the income of high-outcome entrepreneurs is
given by zhf(kt) − Rt(zl)kt − (1 − ξ)∆f(kt). Therefore mt(zh) −mt(zl) = ξ∆f(kt).
Since v(·; rt) is strictly increasing and strictly concave, any optimal contract with
no hiding will require Rt(zh) = Rt(zl) − (1 − ξ)∆f(kt). Thus, also in this case,
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mt(zh) − mt(zl) = ξ∆f(kt). In the case of no hiding however, the total surplus is
larger, as there is no deadweight loss.39 Lemma 3 also holds in the case in which a
portion of (1 − ξ)∆f(kt) accrues to the intermediary. In the extreme case in which
there is no deadweight loss, optimal contracts with hiding and no hiding imply the
same allocation.40
By Lemma 3 we can now restate the optimal contracting problems as follows:
max
kt,Rt(zh),Rt(zl)
ρv [zhf(kt)−Rt(zh)kt, rt+1] + (1− ρ)v [zlf(kt)−Rt(zl)kt, rt+1] (P3)
subject to
ρRt(zh) + (1− ρ)Rt(zl) = rt + δ (19)
v [zhf(kt)−Rt(zh)kt, rt+1] ≥ v [zhf(kt)−Rt(zl)kt − (1− ξ)∆f(kt), rt+1] (20)
It is now evident that for any contract {kt, Rt(zh), Rt(zl)} that solves problem
(P3), there is a contract {kt, τt(zh), τt(zl)} with
τ(zi) ≡ zif(kt)−Rt(zi)kt for i = h, l.
that solves Problem (P2) and implies the same levels of income mt(zh) and mt(zl).
C Occupational choice
In this section we extend our model by endogeneizing the fraction of individuals that
become entrepreneurs. With this extension a larger value of ξ (i.e. a worse risk
sharing technology) can be accommodated along two margins: prices (as above) and
quantities. That is, greater ξ can result in a greater fraction young agents choosing
entrepreneurship, with each being advanced less capital. Our principal objective is to
determine whether and how this new adjustment margin alters our main result from
Section 3.
We assume that the production function is of the form zf(k, n), where n denotes
labor input. We assume that f is homogeneous of degree λ < 1, so that output is
not exhausted if capital and labor are paid their marginal products, which occurs
when ξ = 0. We assume that each individual is endowed with a unit of time available
39Lacker and Weinberg (1989) also note that when the hiding cost function is linear, then contracts
with no hiding are always optimal. However, the same authors show the existence of alternative
specifications of the cost function for which Lemma 3 does not hold.
40The proof of this statement is available from the authors upon request. It was not included
because it requires working with a continuum of outcomes. In fact with a discrete set of outcomes,
any hiding would be detected by the lender.
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Figure 12: Timing in the Model with Occupational Choice.
for work (i.e., we ignore the work/leisure choice) and decides how to allocate it,
either becoming an entrepreneur who hires labor, or working for a wage. Thus, in
equilibrium, every cohort will be divided into workers and entrepreneurs.
We assume that labor is freely mobile, so that at a single wage rate wt must
prevail in equilibrium. The lifetime utility of a worker is given by v (wt; rt+1) , where
the indirect utility function v is defined by (P1).
The entrepreneurs expected lifetime utility is
V (τht, τlt; rt+1) ≡ ρv (τht; rt+1) + (1− ρ) v (τlt; rt+1) ,
where v is defined as in (P1).
Figure 12 describes the timing of an entrepreneur’s choices. Whereas capital is
put in place at the beginning of the period (i.e. before the value of the variable z is
observed), workers can be hired after z is observed.
A contract is, as above, a capital advance, kt, and contingent transfers τit, i =
h, l. But, different from above, the contract now includes hiring recommendations,
nit, i = h, l. We assume that the employment level chosen by the entrepreneur is
public information. Thus, if an entrepreneur misreports his production quality, he
must hire the amount of labor that is consistent with his report. Optimal contracts
solve:
max
kt,nht,nlt,τht,τlt
V (τht, τlt; rt+1) , (P4)
subject to
v (τht; rt+1) ≥ v [τlt + ξ∆f (kt, nlt) ; rt+1] , (21)
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τ¯t ≡ ρτht + (1− ρ) τlt = ρ [zhf (kt, nht)− wtnht] +
(1− ρ) [zlf (kt, nlt)− wtnlt]− (rt + δ) kt, (22)
zif2 (kt, nit) = wt for i = h, l. (23)
Condition (23) requires that hiring be efficient. Absent this assumption, it could be
optimal for the intermediary to recommend hiring labor nlt that is lower than what is
ex-post efficient because this would relax the incentive compatibility constraint and
allow better risk sharing (i.e. lower spread τht− τlt). In other words, the labor hiring
decision would help in providing incentives. Since our intent is to determine how en-
dogeneizing the number of entrepreneurs influences our results, and not to determine
the impact of changes in the contracting environment, we require intermediaries not
to recommend inefficient hiring.
It is immediate that (21) binds. Then, by strict monotonicity of v, we also have
τht = τlt + ξ∆f (kt, nlt) . (24)
Definition 4 Given an initial aggregate capital stock K0 > 0, a competitive equilib-
rium consists of the consumption level of the initial old, co0, contingent consumption
allocations for young and old entrepreneurs, {cyht, c
y
lt}
∞
t=0 and {c
o
ht, c
o
lt}
∞
t=1, consump-
tion allocations for workers, {cywt, c
o
wt+1}
∞
t=0, and sequences of prices, {rt, wt}
∞
t=0, ag-
gregate labor force, {Nt}
∞
t=0, aggregate capital {Kt}
∞
t=0 , contracts {kt, τht, τlt}
∞
t=0, and
individual employment levels {nht, nlt}
∞
t=0 such that for all t ≥ 0
1. consumers optimize, i.e. co0 = k0(1 + r0); for i = h, l c
y
it = τit − s(τit, rt+1) and
coit+1 = s(τit, rt+1)(1+ rt+1); c
y
wt = wt− s(wt, rt+1); and c
o
wt+1 = s(wt, rt+1)(1+
rt+1);
2. contracts and individual employment levels are optimal, i.e. (kt, τht, τlt, nht, nlt)
solves problem (P2),
3. ex-ante, young agents are indifferent between occupations:
v(wt; rt+1) = V (τht, τlt; rt+1); (25)
4. the labor market clears:
Nt = (1−Nt) [ρnht + (1− ρ)nlt] ; (26)
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5. the aggregate capital stock equals capital demand:
Kt = (1−Nt) kt;
and
6. the aggregate capital stock equals capital supply:
Kt+1 = Nts (wt; rt+1) + (1−Nt) [ρs (τht; rt+1) + (1− ρ) s (τlt; rt+1)] .
Using (22) and (24), (P2) can be approached in the same way as we analyzed the
simpler problem in the body of the paper. The tangency condition
∂τ¯t
∂kt
∣∣∣∣
BC
=
∂τ¯t
∂kt
∣∣∣∣
V
. (27)
is necessary for optimality, where
∂τ¯t
∂kt
∣∣∣∣
BC
= ρzhf1 (kt, nht) + (1− ρ) zlf1 (kt, nlt)− (rt + δ) ,
∂τ¯t
∂kt
∣∣∣∣
V
= −ρ (1− ρ) ξ∆
[
f1 (kt, nlt)− f2 (kt, nlt)
f21 (kt, nlt)
f22 (kt, nlt)
]
u′ (cht)− u
′ (clt)
ρu′ (cht) + (1− ρ)u′ (clt)
.
Along with the budget constraint, the tangency condition defines the optimal capital
advance at t. Also, it is easy to verify that condition (25) reduces to
u (wt) = ρu (τht) + (1− ρ)u (τlt) (28)
and is so independent from rt+1.
To make progress, assume a Cobb-Douglas technology: f (kt, n) = k
α
t n
γ
t with
α ≥ 0, γ ≥ 0 and α + γ < 1. In this case, transfers are linear in production. It will
follow that the fraction of entrepreneurs is constant both in a steady state and along
the transition path.
Proposition 4 If the technology is Cobb-Douglas then Nt = N for all t.
Proof. We start by showing that transfers are linear in production. Observe first
that (23) and (26) imply
nit = Ai
Nt
1−Nt
for i = h, l,
where
Ah ≡
[
ρ+ (1− ρ)
(
zl
zh
)1/(1−γ)]−1
Al ≡
(
zl
zh
)1/(1−γ)
Ah.
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Suppose
τit = giy˜t for i = h, l (29)
where
y˜t ≡ k
α
t
(
Nt
1−Nt
)γ
for constants gi, i = h, l. We verify the optimality of (29). Assuming (29),
ω ≡
u′ (cht)− u
′ (clt)
ρu′ (cht) + (1− ρ)u′ (clt)
=
u′ (gh)− u
′ (gl)
ρu′ (gh) + (1− ρ)u′ (gl)
;
where the right hand side is constant over time. The optimal contract is then com-
pletely described by (27), where
∂τ¯t
∂kt
∣∣∣∣
BC
= α
[
ρzhA
γ
h + (1− ρ) zlA
γ
l
] y˜t
kt
− (rt + δ)
∂τ¯t
∂kt
∣∣∣∣
V
= −ρ (1− ρ) ξ∆ω
α
1− γ
Aγl
y˜t
kt
,
the zero-profit condition
τ¯t = (1− γ)
[
ρzhA
γ
h + (1− ρ) zlA
γ
l
]
y˜t − (rt + δ) kt,
and the definitions of transfers
ghy˜t = τ¯t + (1− ρ)∆ξA
γ
l y˜t (30)
gly˜t = τ¯t − ρ∆ξA
γ
l y˜t. (31)
Substituting the preceding four equalities into (30) and (31) leaves gh and gl as a
function of parameters only, verifying our conjecture. Rewriting problem (P4) in the
same way we rewrote problem (P1) in Section 3.2, one can show that (P4) admits a
unique solution. Therefore transfers must take the form described by (29).
Since wages can be written
wt = γzlA
γ−1
l y˜t
1−Nt
Nt
,
the result that Nt = N follows from (28) and (29).
Proposition 4 allows us to recast the whole problem as if capital were the only
input to production, viz. the production function may be rewritten as
yt = z˜tBk
α
t ,
where project quality is the product of a stochastic component z˜t ∈ {z˜l, z˜h} and a de-
terministic component B. Both newly defined parameters, z˜t and B, are complicated
functions of the remaining parameters of the model. However, only B depends on ξ.
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This finding implies that, qualitatively, the dynamics implied by the extended
model are the same as in the simpler one. But more specifically, changes in ξ lead
not only to effects on the aggregate demand and supply of capital analogous to those
described in Section 3, and also to new effects operating through B. The variation
in B triggered by the change in ξ captures precisely the adjustment along the en-
trepreneurial sector margin that we wish to emphasize.
The expression for aggregate employment turns out to be
N =
γzlA
γ−1
l
γzlA
γ−1
l +
[
ρg1−σh + (1− ρ) g
1−σ
l
]1/(1−σ) ,
and
B =
(
γzlA
γ−1
l
ρg1−σh + (1− ρ) g
1−σ
l
)γ
,
where the parameters Al, gh and gl are defined in the proof of Proposition 4.
Like Figure 6, Figure 13 shows the time paths of several variables for two economies
that differ only in the levels of investor protection. For the chosen parameters, the
fraction of entrepreneurs (1 − Nt) is larger in the economy with poorer protection.
A given aggregate capital may now be split across a larger number of entrepreneurs,
reducing the capital advanced to each, and so offsetting the increase in risk and
expected transfer τ¯ triggered by an increase in ξ. This dampens the surge in savings.
In summary, the qualitative effects of poorer protection on the paths of interest
rate, aggregate capital, and transfers, resemble those in Section 3. Despite the intro-
duction of a new margin for adjustment, an increase in ξ still has a positive effect on
capital accumulation.
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